Our Gemara on Amud Beis discusses extra efforts to defend a suspect in a capital case, emphasizing the importance of finding every possible angle to mitigate the crime. One aspect of this approach is that the court will favor and allow appeals based on new evidence or novel arguments for exoneration, as opposed to later discovering arguments for conviction.

The Mishna teaches that in cases of capital law, the court may bring the accused back to be judged again with a claim to acquit him, but does not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable. To explain the terms “innocent” and “righteous” in the verse “And the innocent and the righteous you shall not slay” (Exodus 23:7), the Sages teach: From where is it derived that if someone is leaving court having been found liable, and someone says, “I have the ability to teach a reason to acquit him,” the court should bring the accused back to be judged again? The verse states: “The innocent you shall not slay,” implying that the accused may indeed be innocent.

From where is it derived that if someone is leaving court having been acquitted, and someone says, “I have the ability to teach a reason to find him liable,” the court should not bring the accused back? The verse states: “The righteous you shall not slay,” meaning that the accused has already been found righteous in his trial.

The scriptural proofs are difficult to understand in English. The verse uses two adjectives to describe the person: “The innocent (naki) and the righteous (tzaddik) you shall not slay.” Rashi explains that in this context, the word naki, which literally means “clean” or “innocent,” connotes total innocence, not merely apparent innocence. Thus, this part of the verse stresses the importance of ensuring that someone who is authentically innocent does not get wrongfully convicted. Therefore, even after deliberations have closed, if someone comes forward with a new argument or evidence, the case must be reopened. On the other hand, the word tzaddik (righteous) in this usage refers to someone who may appear innocent but is not necessarily authentically so. In this case, if deliberations have closed and the person has been found innocent, even if new evidence arises, the case is not reopened.

These derivations hinge on the distinction between naki and tzaddik. The Bais Yaakov (Noach 10) speaks about the limitations of a tzaddik, which has remarkable psychological implications. He says that Noach was described as a tzaddik, meaning he overcame his inclinations and behaved decently. However, inside, he still struggled. In contrast, Avraham and others achieved a status beyond tzaddik. Avraham, through and through, only wanted to do good and had righteous inclinations. A naki, someone who is clean or innocent, has pure intentions.

The Bais Yaakov makes a remarkable point: sometimes, even if one’s behavior up to that point was not righteous, if a person resolves within themselves to do only good, they are seen as innocent. After all, he argues, why would God punish someone for past actions? Such punishment would reflect a poor character trait of bearing a grudge and taking revenge. Punishments come only based on the person’s current intentions. You might ask, what about repentance and past bad deeds? It seems these are only problematic because they entrench behaviors and attitudes in our character. But the real issue is not the past; it’s the present. This is why a tzaddik, like Noach, still had to go through the suffering of building the ark, because he wasn’t yet pure inside. Although his behavior was decent, he was still restraining his impulses. In contrast, the Jewish people at the Red Sea didn’t need anyone to build them an ark. Their purity of intention allowed for no suffering and greater miracles.

The Bais Yaakov also quotes a remarkable statement from Midrash Tanchuma: “A person should not worry about sins they have committed, even intentionally, but rather the only concern is that a door has been opened for them to commit many more sins.”

He does not provide the exact location in Midrash Tanchuma, but after some research, I found the following in Midrash Tanchuma (Vayikra 10): “A person should not worry about a sin they have committed by mistake, but rather that an opening has been made for them to sin, even by mistake or even deliberately.”

This is fascinating because a small shift in phrasing makes all the difference. Bais Yaakov’s version of the Midrash reads as “do not worry about even past intentional sins,” while the text I found reads, “do not worry about unintentional sins.” The main point in both is that habit will lead to more unintentional or even intentional sins. According to our reading, the Midrash emphasizes that one should not be concerned about unintentional sins because the real problem lies in the formation of sinful habits. But Bais Yaakov’s reading introduces a revolutionary theological idea: do not even feel bad about past intentional sins, because the main thing is one’s attitude now. If the attitude is pure and focused on doing good, the residue of past sins will only harm you if it influences your future behavior. God has no interest in punishing a person for past mistakes.

I am hesitant to say that all evidence suggests that Bais Yaakov misremembered and misquoted the Midrash, leading him to a novel, revolutionary idea. By inverting the position of “even intentional” in the sentence, he changed the entire meaning. Is there any way to defend Bais Yaakov’s version with the text? His idea could be supported if you place a period in the middle of the sentence: “an opening has been made to sin.” Then the phrase “even by mistake or even deliberately” could refer to the past sins in the first sentence. However, this interpretation is forced, and Bais Yaakov clearly read the text and quoted it differently. The question remains: did he have a different manuscript, or was he simply misremembering?

However, there is another way to explain his position. Even if we read the Midrash according to the original phrasing, the core idea is psychologically similar to Bais Yaakov’s message. If the main issue with sin is habituation, and now he has a pure heart so he does not intend to sin, then the addition of Bais Yaakov’s novel argument—that God has no need for revenge—would suggest that past sins are less of a concern. The real issue lies in one’s attitude now. If a person’s attitude is pure and their desire is to do good, then the past is less important. So even if Bais Yaakov misquoted the text, the theological truth he expressed can remain valid.

Translations Courtesy of Sefaria, except when, sometimes, I disagree with the translation

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