Our Gemara on Amud Aleph discusses certain situations where the Rabbis of the Bais Din do not overturn a ruling when later evidence and new doubts arise over the original testimony. Simply put, once there is a verdict, the burden of proof to overturn the evidence is much higher. After a legal matter was decided, the “greater good” value of preserving the courts’ popular authority trumps the need to review prior evidence. This is known as Zilusa de bei Dinah, literally, “cheapening the House of Law.”

Maskil Ledavid (Devarim 19:19) uses this concept to help explain, what on the surface, seems to be an irrational Torah law. Based on an inference from the verse (ibid) the Gemara rules (Makkos 5b):

If the conspiring witnesses have not yet killed the accused with their testimony they are executed, but if they killed the accused with their testimony they are not executed.

This is odd.  The perpetrators who succeed are not punished, while those who attempt a crime and are thwarted are executed? Some try to explain the logic of this law as follows: Once a verdict is followed through, we presume that this was ultimately the will of God. Surely, God would not allow such a travesty to occur when the judges were not intellectually lazy and acted in good faith! It must be that the so-called innocent victim of justice must have secretly committed other crimes, and was deserving of his fate.

Maskil Ledovid does not consider that explanation valid because there is a well-known theological principle that though Hashem miraculously prevents the righteous from inadvertently sinning, this is only in regard to ingesting non-kosher food, because it also defiles the body and soul even if accidentally ingested. Indeed, Tosafos (Chulin 5b, “Tzaddikim”) proves this distinction and actually cites a case from the Talmud where a great sage incorrectly issued a death sentence in his court. Therefore, Maskil Ledovid argues that the reason the testimony is not overturned after the death sentence is executed is so as not to disgrace the court, ALONG with an assumption that this was God’s will.

Regardless, let us consider the implications of the first argument, that once due diligence is made, the outcome of the righteous still represents God’s will. Such an idea offers an interesting life lesson on the Torah’s perspective on what we consider truth. If one is righteous, acting in good faith and making efforts to analyze all the facts, the ultimate action might be the will of God, even when it was under false pretenses.

This kind of argument is also similarly applied in other theological/legal situations. For example, Rav Dessler holds (Michtav Me-Eliyahu, IV: p. 355) that even when the sages made a ruling and were explicitly based on their own scientific evidence, which appears to be incorrect according to our knowledge, the Halacha remains valid. Rav Dessler says we assume that either they had a tradition that the Halacha was true regardless, and the Sages just offered additional evidence to support the tradition similar to the talmudic practice of using an asmachta verse to support an existing tradition, or we just assume it’s God’s will anyhow. 

Some famous examples of this are that the Sages maintained that a cat has venom injectors in its nails, causing its scratches to render an animal a treifah (Chulin 52), or that certain insects are kosher as they are not derived from sexual reproduction but rather arise spontaneously, (Shabbos 107b.) Rav Glasner, in his introduction to Dor Revi’i on Chulin is more explicit, stating even if we know the sages made a scientific error, the nature of Halacha is that a rule of the Sanhedrin BECOMES binding by the Torah, no matter the reason. The Torah law remains in effect until such a time as another Sanhedrin would choose to vote and issue a new ruling. But what do we do when we no longer have a  Sanhedrin?

Rav Kook (Shemoneh Kevatzim 2:30) uses this argument to theologically explain certain de facto historical situations where erroneous practices become accepted and the apparent customary practice.  He states:

At times, when there is a need to disregard words of Torah but there is no one in the generation who can show the way, the matter comes about by means of a disruption. At any rate, it is better for the world that such a matter comes about by means of an error. In this inheres the principle, “Better that people [do wrong] in error and not with purposeful intent” (Beitzah 30b). Only when prophecy is present in [the nation of] Israel is it possible to institute such a matter – by means of a temporary injunction. Then it is done openly, with permission and as a Godly command. But in consequence of the sealing of the light of prophecy, this rectification come about by means of a [longlasting] disruption that, although it dismays the heart from the aspect of its outer being, causes it to rejoice from the aspect of its inner being.

Rav Kook holds that in modern times, without a Sanhedrin, the collective unconscious wisdom of the Jewish people can channel God’s will, and this explains how certain customs and sensitivities seem to evolve in Halacha without actual rabbinic approval. 

Translations Courtesy of Sefaria, except when, sometimes, I disagree with the translation

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