Daf Yomi, Marriage Counseling, Psychotherapy, Rabbi Simcha Feuerman, Torah and Psychology
Our Gemara on this daf discussed the concept that a ritual slaughter which is unable to accomplish its purpose is considered a null act and has no implications. For example, if one slaughters a tereifa or an animal that is forbidden to benefit from (such as one convicted of killing a human), since the slaughtering did not accomplish its ultimate purpose of rendering the meat permitted to eat, this slaughtering has no ritual effect whatsoever. The difference being, there would be no requirement to cover its blood, if it were the kind of animal that normally would require it, and also the mother or child could be slaughtered on the same day and eaten because the first slaughter was not really valid. This is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
Rabbi Shimon is known throughout Shas for a number of trademark opinions. This is one of them. Another famous opinion of his is regarding an unintentional act, which under many circumstances is permitted, such as dragging a chair on the ground, even though it could make a furrow (Beitzah 23a).
And the most famous of Rabbi Shimon’s opinions is that he will infer the implied logical reason for a commandment, and therefore use that reason to allow for exceptions when it runs against the apparent logic.
For example, the Gemara (Bava Metzia 115a) discusses the prohibition (Devarim 24:17) “Do not take the cloak of a widow as collateral.”
Presumably, this commandment is to protect and have compassion over a widow who tends to be economically vulnerable and impoverished. (The Gemara actually develops this further. Since there is an additional command to return required collaterals when needed, he will end up frequenting her house, leading to rumors of impropriety.) What about a wealthy widow? Rabbi Yehuda holds there is no exception, as the law applies from generalities. Rabbi Shimon uses the apparent logic that this is a safety net for a poor widow, therefore it does not apply to a wealthy widow.
Rav Cohen (the “Nazir,” Kol Nevuah 147) notes that this is a key philosophical and psychological outlook of Rabbi Shimon. The mitzvos are evaluated in terms of their essence. Slaughtering is only meaningful if it accomplishes the purpose of enabling the food to be kosher to eat, an action is only sinful if intended, and globally, any commandment’s specific laws can be induced from its apparent meaning and function.
We do not rule in accordance with Rabbi Shimon. It is important to digest that Rabbi Shimon’s Torah would be a different universe. Effectively, according to him, the Sanhedrin would be empowered to deduce new laws from their implications in the same manner that they darshen verses. Just as an example, the Gemara Niddah (31b) states:
“Rabbi Meir would say: For what reason does the Torah say that a menstruating woman is prohibited from engaging in intercourse with her husband for seven days? It is because if a woman were permitted to engage in intercourse with her husband all the time, her husband would be too accustomed to her, and would eventually be repulsed by her. Therefore, the Torah says that a menstruating woman shall be ritually impure for seven days, during which she is prohibited from engaging in intercourse with her husband, so that when she becomes pure again she will be dear to her husband as at the time when she entered the wedding canopy with him.”
Would Rabbi Shimon’s Sanhedrin therefore be lenient with a woman who had a disease and suffered from constant staining, because the purpose of the commandment to enhance love is being thwarted? Or the reverse, if medically, such as via hormones or IUD, a woman does not menstruate, should they still practice some separation? Indeed, Rabbi Shimon’s Torah and his Sanhedrin could have made a very different Judaism! Keep in mind though, even according to Rabbi Shimon, it would not be willy-nilly. Each circumstance would require a rabbinic ruling much as the Gemara uses Kal v’chomer and other derivations to create rulings. It still requires a careful judicial process. Nevertheless, the potential and implications are staggering.
Allow me to explain:
Rav Kook (Moreh Nevuchei Hador 13) suggests a procedure for a messianic future that can grapple with many of the halachic conundrums that we face in the modern world. The classic rabbinic position, especially in reaction and resistance to Reform or Conservative theologies that suggest we update the Torah, is to double down and declare the Torah is divine and perfect and needs no modification. While of course this is true, and we humbly accept mitzvos and commandments even when we do not understand them, the Sanhedrin did have the power in the past to make certain adjustments. (See Yevamos 89b-90b.) If the future Sanhedrin would rule in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, who holds that one may deduce a reason for a commandment and then base halachic rulings upon the deduced reason, then many laws could be changed. For example, consider the rule that a woman is disqualified from serving as a witness, as a judge, and even for prayers in a minyan. If the logical deductive reason for the rules can be ascertained, such as the rigors and responsibilities of pregnancy, childbirth, and childcare making such obligations an unfair burden, then in a more technologically advanced post-industrial modern society the rules could be re-evaluated. Because according to Rabbi Shimon, if there is an obvious deducible reason for a commandment, different exceptions to the Halacha can be applied. Of course such a Sanhedrin also might conclude that the Torah had other reasons and see no need to make a change, but in theory, this would be no different than, as we saw earlier in this essay, that Rabbi Shimon allowed a person to take security from a wealthy widow even though the verse did not specify such an exemption.
I stress again that this would not be an action done on a whim by a sole rabbi, but rather a responsible, measured rabbinical process and response from a fully empowered Sanhedrin. As they say, “do not attempt this at home.”
Why does this matter? It matters because some people subjectively experience certain commandments as unfair and not attuned to modern life. For the moment, it doesn’t matter whether this subjective experience is correct. After all, each of us might have personal reasons why a particular commandment does not seem fair, but God in His wisdom knows better. At the same time, it is hard to think that with all the changes in the modern world, certain ideas also might not affect the way we experience mitzvos. And, while we can appreciate the wisdom and caution that the majority of the rabbinic community took, fearing a groundswell of reform or conservative sentiment that would lead to people rejecting the laws of the Torah and its wisdom over modern fads and reactions, a global answer that every single thing is to remain the same is not satisfying to many people. Rav Kook offered an intelligent, respectful and rational alternative to this challenge. Even though at this point there is no Sanhedrin nor a Messiah, it allows a person to feel that the Torah, in principle, could be accommodating to certain needs or changes that legitimately come from changes in society or circumstances.
sponsored by https://empowermentaftertrauma.com/
Translations Courtesy of Sefaria, except when, sometimes, I disagree with the translation
Free resource for couples/families:
Over 80 lectures on heathy communication, marriage and sexuality from a Torah perspective Click here
If you liked this, you might enjoy my Relationship Communications Guide. Click on the link above.
Rabbi Simcha Feuerman, Rabbi Simcha Feuerman, LCSW-R, LMFT, DHL is a psychotherapist who works with high conflict couples and families. He can be reached via email at simchafeuerman@gmail.com